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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of wage compression for the
gender wage gap in Sweden during the period 1968-1991. We find that the
effects of changes in the wage structure on women’s wages have varied over
time and have had partly counteracting effects. Changes in industry wage
differentials have systematically worked against women, while the changes in
the returns to human capital and unobserved characteristics have contributed
to reductions in the gender wage gap. Changes in the wage structure were
particularly important between 1968 and 1974, when the reduction of overall
wage inequality was dramatic. In 1981, however, the wage compression ef-
fect accounted only for a minor proportion of women's relative wage gains,
as compared to 1974. At this time, women gained in relative wages mainly
because discrimination was mitigated and/or the gender gap in unobserved
skills was reduced. Between 1981 and 1991 there is a small increase in the
gender wage gap. This small increase seems to have been driven by changed
inter-industry wage differentials.4
1. Introduction
From the 1960’s to the early 1980’s the Swedish gender earnings gap was
reduced dramatically. This put Swedish women into a top position in inter-
national comparisons of female relative pay. Since the mid 1980’s, however,
the trend increase in female relative earnings has halted. Similarly, overall
wage inequality decreased very rapidly during the late 1960’s, continued to
fall during the 1970’s. Since the mid-1980’s, however, wage inequality has
started to increase again. Still, in international comparisons, the Swedish
wage structure stands out as being one of the most compressed among the
industrialized countries.
One of the obvious explanations to the increasing relative wages of
women up to the early 1980’s in Sweden is that the compression of the over-
all wage structure was particularly important for women, who tended to be
located in the lower part of the wage distribution. A combination of union
wage policy and demand/supply factors raised the price of less skilled labor.
For example, decreasing returns to work experience tended to reduced the
gender pay gap since women tend to have less work experience.
Other mechanisms were at work as well, though. A number of political
reforms were carried out in order to improve women’s position in the labor
market. More generous parental leave benefits, subsidized child care and the
introduction of separate taxation of spouses are examples of reforms that
may potentially have increased women’s incentives for human capital invest-
ments and strengthened labor force attachment.
The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the connection
between overall wage dispersion and the gender gap in Sweden. As noted
above, the gender wage gap has moved with changes in wage dispersion.
This has been interpreted as union wage policy being one of the foremost
explanations to the decreasing gender gap. Here we will try to disentangle
the effect of wage compression on the gender gap from other effects. This
will also enable us to take a closer look at the related question of whether the
increasing relative wages for women really means that the relative position of
women in the wage distribution has changed. The method used to analyze
the relationship between wage dispersion and wage differentials was pro-5
posed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991), and was applied to international
differences in gender wage gaps by Blau and Kahn (1996).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the institu-
tional background is briefly described, both regarding the overall wage set-
ting framework and changes in gender specific institutions. Section 3 de-
scribes some basic facts about the economic position of females since the late
1960s. In section 4 the method to decompose gender wage differentials is
presented along with the empirical estimates of the decomposition of the
gender gap. The analysis is based on four representative samples of the
Swedish population; the Level of Living Surveys (LNU) for 1968, 1974,
1981, and 1991. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary and a discus-
sion of the results.
2. Institutional background
The history and details about Swedish industrial relations are well de-
scribed elsewhere.
1 Suffice here to mention three key characteristics of the
Swedish labor market up to the mid 1980’s. First, union density is high by
international standards. According to the labor force surveys, 81 percent of
the employees were union members in 1991, and unionization rates show
negligible variations across broad educational and occupational groups. Sec-
ond, wage setting was highly centralized. Initially, two large players, the
blue-collar trade union confederation (LO) and the employers’ federation
(SAF) dominated the arena. Centralization was a pre-requisite for the third
key element - solidarity wage policy. In its early implementation solidarity
wage policy was mainly aiming at “equal pay for equal work”. Later on,
based on strong ideological convictions among the union leaders and the
membership at large, the aim of the policy turned to overall wage equaliza-
tion.
During the late 1970’s this stable environment started to crumble. In
1983, one of the leading unions, the metal workers’ union, and their em-
ployer counterpart broke out of the centralized agreements and struck a
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separate agreement. This “break-down” of centralization marked a new era
in Swedish wage setting, with more varying degree of centralization and in-
creasing importance of industry-level agreements. The exact shape of Swe-
den's future wage bargaining system is however very much an open question.
Apart from the general changes in the Swedish institutional setting de-
scribed above, there have been numerous institutional changes affecting
women's position in the labor market since the early 1960s.
2 These changes,
that occurred through both collective bargaining and legislation, can be cate-
gorized in two broad groups; First, "demand-side" changes may have a direct
influence on the male/female wage gap, e.g. anti-discrimination legislation.
Second, "supply-side" changes will affect wages through changing incentives
for labor market behavior, e.g. parental leave policies. This categorization is,
of course, simplified and crude, but may nevertheless serve as a guideline for
this presentation.
The perhaps most important change on the demand-side was the cen-
tral agreement on gender wage equality between LO and SAF in 1960. This
agreement stipulated the gradual removal of the separate wage-schedules for
females to be completed in 1965. This agreement can be said to be a result of
the work of a LO-SAF committee on gender wage equality initiated in 1948,
but the public debate on this issue has a much longer history. The separate
female wage-schedules in government were abolished in 1947, long before
the LO-SAF agreement.
In terms of direct legal regulation of equal pay, Sweden was very late
compared to many other Western countries; see e.g. Blau and Kahn (1992).
The Act on Equality between Men and Women at Work was passed as late
as 1980, even if anti-discriminatory regulations had been present since 1974;
see e.g. Gustafsson and Lantz (1985). The 1980 Equality Act was preceded
by the 1977 central agreement on equal treatment of men and women be-
tween LO/PTK and SAF for the private sector. The effects of these changes
on female relative pay are not well established empirically, though; see e.g.
Löfström (1989).
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nung and Persson (1990).7
The main thrust of Swedish policy to improve women's position in the
labor market has been directed towards the supply-side. Educational reforms
during the 1960s have opened up higher education for women, resulting in a
rapid catch-up of women's educational level relative to men's; Gustafsson and
Lantz (1985). Actually, since the mid-1970s, the school enrollment rate of
women aged 20-24 years have exceeded that of men, and this difference has
increased over time; Edin and Holmlund (1995). Separate taxation of
spouses was introduced gradually as a voluntary option in 1966 and made
mandatory in 1971. Given the high marginal tax rates in Sweden during this
time, this reform provided large supply incentives for many married women
through substantial increases in hourly take home pay.
The perhaps most far-reaching Swedish reforms in an international per-
spective concern the treatment of women with children. The combination of
maternity/parental leave, subsidized public day-care, and employment secu-
rity is probably a major explanation to the high labor force participation rates
in Sweden. Unpaid maternity leave dates back to the early part of this cen-
tury, but the modern form started to take shape in 1955 when parental leave
benefits were introduced. The present system for parental leave benefits, with
compensation rules that depend on previous work and earnings, can be
viewed as a major incentive for labor force participation and human capital
accumulation among younger women; Albrecht et al. (1999). These incen-
tives are reinforced by employment security regulations. In 1939 a law was
passed to prevent employers to fire women due to marriage and child-
bearing. These regulation were strengthened with the passing of the Em-
ployment Security Act in 1974, when strict rules for "just cause" of dismiss-
als were introduced. The public day-care system has been gradually ex-
panded during the 1970s and 1980s. The high subsidization rate (about 90
percent) have reduced the costs of labor market participation for women
with children substantially; Gustafsson and Stafford (1992).
3. The economic position of women in Sweden8
The previous section indicates some major changes in the institutional
framework concerning women in the labor market. This section turns to the
outcome of these changes in terms of providing some basic facts of the eco-
nomic position of women. This brief presentation is organized around three
issues: supply changes, wage changes, and demand changes.
 3
By international standards, Sweden has a very high labor force partici-
pation rate among women. In the mid 1980s, the Swedish female participa-
tion rate was the highest among the OECD-countries; OECD (1988). Par-
ticipation rates calculated from the Labour Force Surveys for the period
1963 - 1998 by gender are shown in Figure 1. The figure shows a trend in-
crease in female participation up until the recession in the 1990’s. Since the
late 1980s, the female participation rates have actually been very close to
male participation rates. During the economic downturn in the 1990’s both
men and women exhibit falling participation rates, and there are still no signs
of a recovery.
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Figure 1 Labor Force Participation Rates for Males and Females Aged
18 to 64, (percent)
Source: Labour Force Surveys (AKU)
A major component of these high participation rates is part-time em-
ployment. The share of part-time workers in employment was increasing
during the 1960s and 1970s for both men and women, though the levels were
very different. In the early 1980s more than 50 percent of female employ-
ment was part-time, while the corresponding figure for men was about 15
percent. During the 1980s there is a tendency to a decreasing rate of part-
time work among women.
 These changes are also evident in data on average
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Figure 2 Average Weekly Hours of Work for Employed Males and
Females Aged 18 to 64.
Source: Labour Force Survey (AKU)
By international standards, the gender wage gap in Sweden is very
small; Blau and Kahn (1996). This does not mean that they are negligible
though, and there are numerous papers investigating the reason for the gap.
4
The time-series development of the gender gap is illustrated in Figure 3 using
data representative of the Swedish population. The lower graph gives the
female average hourly earnings relative average male earnings. The figure
indicates that even if female relative earnings are still increasing, the rate of
increase has been much lower after 1980 than during the 1960s and 1970s.
The upper graph shows the gender wage differential standardized for differ-
ences in work experience and education using a simple dummy variable rep-
resentation.
5 This graph shows that female relative earnings have risen to al-
most 90 percent of male earnings in the early 1980s. However, the graph also
indicates that the unexplained wage differential has increased in recent years.
The standardized female/male wage ratio is actually decreasing after 1984.
Thus, to the extent that the unexplained wage differential reflects discrimina-
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(1990), Svensson (1992), and Zetterberg (1994). For further references, see SOU
1997:136.
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tion, the recent development does not rule out increasing discrimination in
recent years.
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Source: Edin and Holmlund (1995)
The large increases in women's relative pay occurred simultaneously
with increasing female labor market participation. There may be several rea-
sons to this, but one obvious candidate is the demand for female labor. Direct
measures of demand shifts are difficult to obtain, so here we will have to set-
tle with measures of sectoral shifts in employment. Edin and Holmlund
(1995) applied the "fixed manpower requirements" model using data on
seven sectors covering the entire economy and calculated the relative de-
mand for female labor at time t as12
( ) ft t j N fj j E E = ￿ a (1)
where E is total employment , Ej is employment in sector j, , and  afj  = Efj
/Ej  is the fixed female requirement coefficient calculated as the proportion
female workers to total employment in industry j. Three years - 1971, 1984
and 1991 – were used to calculate the requirement coefficient. The calcu-
lated demand shifts are reported in Table 1. Measured relative demand for
females increased sharply between 1968 and 1981. During the 1980s, in
contrast, there were virtually no changes in relative demand. This develop-
ment is partly driven by the rapid growth of public sector employment during
the 1970s, and the subsequent deceleration of public sector expansion during
the 1980s. The demand pattern is strikingly similar to the relative wage pat-
tern of females. Clearly relative demand shifts for female labor is a factor that
cannot be overlooked in an investigation of gender wage differential in Swe-
den.
Table 1 Changes in Female Relative Wages, Relative Demand and
Supply
Years Dln(Wf/Wm) D lnNf D ln(Lf/Lm)
1968 - 1974 0.057 0.084 0.152
1974 - 1981 0.057 0.069 0.170
1981 - 1984 0.023 0.018 0.039
1984 - 1991 -0.010 -0.012 0.041
Note: Dln(Wf/Wm) is the change in the standardized female relative wage,
DlnNf is the change in relative demand according to Eq. (1), and D
ln(Lf/Lm) is the change in female/male shares of the labor force.
Source: Edin and Holmlund (1995).
4. The wage structure and the gender wage gap
In this section we analyze the evolution of the gender wage gap between
1968 and 1991. Factors affecting the gender wage gap can divided into those
that are gender specific and those that are related to the wage structure in
general. Gender specific factors include women’s relative levels of labor13
market qualifications and discrimination. The wage structure describes the
array of returns to observed and unobserved skills, and the rent received for
employment in particular sectors in the economy. In order to disentangle
gender specific changes and changes in the wage structure, we utilize a
method developed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) hereafter JMP, which
is an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. More specifically, the
JMP-technique enables us to decompose changes in the unexplained gender
wage gap into one part that is due to changes in the wage structure and one
part that is due to changes in gender specific differences. We start this sec-
tion by briefly discussing the JMP-decomposition before we go into the re-
sults. For comprehensive discussions of the JMP-decomposition, see JMP
(1991, 1993), Blau and Kahn (1997), Suen (1997)  and Richardson (1997).
4.1 The JMP-decomposition
Suppose that the log hourly wage of a male worker i in year t, yit,  can be
described by:
q s b it t t it it X y + =     where      ~ ( ,1) it q 0 ,  (2)
where Xit is a vector of observed characteristics, and bt  gives the returns to
these characteristics. Instead of using a conventional notation for the error
term, we let  qit  be a ”standardized” residual with zero mean and unit vari-
ance, and  st  be the residual standard deviation, i.e. the level of male residual
wage inequality. This wage equation can be used to calculate the gender
(log) wage gap at time t:
 6
t mt ft D y y = - = ( ) ( ) mt ft t t mt ft t t t t X X X - + - = + b s q q s q b D D     (3)
where subscripts mt and ft denote the averages of male and female values
respectively, and D denotes male-female average difference of the variable
immediately following. This is the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.
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The first term on the right-hand-side is the part of the wage gap that is
”explained” by a gender difference in the average level of observed charac-
teristics. The second term is the part of the gender wage gap that cannot be
explained by differences in observed characteristics. This part is usually at-
tributed to differences in unobserved skills and discrimination. The unex-
plained wage gap is here written as the gender difference in the standardized
residual multiplied by the money value per unit difference in the standardized
residual (st).
The change in the gender wage gap between two years (s and t, s > t) can
be decomposed using (3) to:
s t s t t s t D D X X X s - = - + - + ( ) ( ) D D D b b b t s t s s t s q q q s s ( ) ( ) D D D - + -
(4)
This is the JMP-decomposition which consists of four parts. The first term,
the ”observed-X’s effect”, reflects the contribution of a changing gender
difference in observed labor market qualifications. Second, the ”observed
prices effect” reflects the contribution of changing prices of observed labor
market qualifications for males. Third, the ”gap effect” captures whether
women are moving up or down in the male residual distribution (i.e. whether
women rank higher or lower within the male residual wage distribution).
Women would, for example, move up in the male residual distribution if they
improve their level of unobserved skills relative men, or if labor market dis-
crimination of women is mitigated over time. Fourth, a change in the male
residual distribution (st) will affect the unexplained wage gap even if women
maintain the same relative position in the male residual distribution. If we
interpret a change in residual inequality among men as a rise in the market
premium for skills, then this effect represent a general relative price effect.
This effect is denominated the ”unobserved prices effect”.
To estimate the decomposition we follow JMP (1991).
7 We start by
estimating the male wage equation for each year. Secondly, we predict what
wage each woman would have had if she was paid according to the estimated15
male wage equation. The first two components are straightforward to calcu-
late using the estimated coefficients and sample means by gender. The aver-
age difference between women’s actual wages and the average of the pre-
dicted wages, is the unexplained gender wage gap, stDqt. (Note that men’s
average wage residual is always zero.)
A change in the unexplained gender wage gap is the sum of the ”gap
effect” and the ”unobserved prices effect”. The ”gap effect” is found by using
each woman’s wage residual in year s to calculate her percentile ranking in
the male wage residual distribution for that year. We then impute the wage
residual she would have had in time period t given her percentile ranking in
time period s.
8 The difference between the average of the imputed wage re-
siduals in time period s and the average residual in time period t is used to
compute the ”gap effect” st(Dqs-Dqt). Consequently, the ”gap effect” meas-
ures the average wage effect due to changed positions of women within the
same male residual distribution (the time period  t distribution). The
”unobserved prices effect” is found as the difference Dqs(ss-st). Here the
percentile location (each woman’s position ) is held fixed, and the effect re-
flects changes in residual inequality for men.
The possibility of labor market discrimination of women complicates
the interpretation of the ”unobserved prices effect,” see discussions by JMP
(1991) and Blau and Kahn (1997). JMP discusses a case where the wage loss
of women due to discrimination is sensitive to changes in the wage structure.
To see this, assume that the residual equals:  ) ( dit it t it t - = d s q s ,   where d it
reflects individual i’s relative level of unobserved skills and  dit reflect labor
market discrimination, so that  0 < = d d t it    if i is a woman and  0 = dit  if i is a
man. The unobserved prices effect will in this case in part reflect the interac-
tion between year s’s  level of discrimination and the change in the residual
distribution, namely  ) ( s s is it s d - . This interaction effect determines how
large the penalty is for that lower position in the distribution. Hence as the
                                                                                                                                            
7 See Richardson (1997) for an alternative estimator.
8 A woman’s percentile location indicates her relative level of unobserved skills (assuming
no discrimination). Because the percentile ranking is calculated on residual wages, and not
on the quantity of unobserved skills, it is important that the returns to unobserved skills
increase monotonously with the level of skills.16
wage differentials among men increases, the cost to women rises for being
moved down a given amount in men’s distribution.
9 It seems reasonable to
consider this effect to be gender specific since it is a consequence of market-
specific treatment of women.
Suen (1997) discusses the JMP-decomposition and a different type of
discrimination which is independent of the wage structure. To see this, as-
sume instead that the residual equals:  dit it t it t - = d s q s . In this case the em-
pirical decomposition using percentile rankings to identify the ”gap effect”
produces biased estimates. The intuition is easily understood in the following
example. Suppose there is only one woman with an, compared to men, aver-
age level of unobserved skills. However, due to discrimination she earns a d
percent lower wage than comparable men (irrespective of wage inequality).
An increase in the returns to unobserved skills will improve her position in
the male residual distribution. The reason is that more men, with a below av-
erage level of unobserved skills, will be paid a lower wage than this woman.
Hence, although neither her relative level of unobserved skills nor the degree
of discrimination have changed, her position in male residual distribution has
improved. To sum up, when the returns to unobserved skills increases (de-
creases) the estimation procedure will tend to produce, to women, beneficial
(detrimental) ”gap effects”.
This estimation problem, pointed out by Suen, will not arise if the
level of discrimination is sensitive to changes in the wage structure. In this
latter case changes in the positions of women reflect either changes in the
relative level of unobserved skills or changes in the level of discrimination.
Empirically it is still an unsolved question to what extent discrimination is
sensitive to changes in the wage structure. In this paper we find that the de-
cline in the overall wage inequality in the sixties and seventies is accompa-
nied by a decline in the unexplained part of the gender wage gap. Further,
when we decompose the changes in unexplained gender wage gap we find
substantial positive gap effects on women’s relative wages. To the extent
that discrimination against women is independent of changes in the wage
                                                       
9 This would, for example, be the case when women do not have access to higher positions
to the same extent as men and the wage premiums to higher positions change over time.17
structure we underestimate the beneficial gap effect and the true beneficial
gap effects are probably larger than our estimates. Our qualitative conclu-
sions are however not affected by this problem.
4.2 Results
We use data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey 1968, 1974, 1981 and
1991, see Erikson and Åberg (1987). In 1968 a representative sample of the
Swedish population aged between 15 and 75 were interviewed about, among
other things, education, work experience and job characteristics. In 1974,
1981 and 1991 the same individuals were interviewed again and comple-
mentary samples of young persons and immigrants were collected in order to
keep the sample representative in these years too. A summary description of
the data used is given in Table A1 for employed
10 men and women aged 18
to 65.
The estimated male wage equations which are used to calculate the
JMP-decompositions are reported in Table A2a. (The corresponding female
wage equations are reported in Table A2b for comparison.) The dependent
variable is the log hourly wage and the explanatory variables are years of
work experience
11 and it’s square, a set of dummy-variables for educational
groups and 26 dummy variables indicating industry.
The estimated male coefficients of the human capital variables in Table
A2a reflect the pronounced wage compression during the 1960s and 1970s.
The change between 1981 and 1991 in of the estimated coefficients does not
indicate such a clear-cut pattern. This time-pattern, a decrease up to the mid-
eighties and then a slight increase in wage differentials, is consistent with
trade union wage policy as discussed in section 2. However, also alternative
interpretations in terms of supply shifts are consistent with this pattern, see
Edin and Holmlund (1995).
                                                       
10 Part-time workers are included. However, our results are not affected when we exclude
part-time workers from the samples.
11 The variable is based on the interview person’s answer to the question: How many years
of work experience do you have? We have not corrected for possibility that the interview
person worked part-time.18
Table 3, which provides some basic information on each sample of
workers, shows that the gender wage gap declined by approximately 40 per
cent between 1968 and 1981. This improvement in women’s relative wage is
mainly due to the large decline in the unexplained gender wage gap (-stDqt).
An increasing part of the gender wage gap can therefore be explained by ei-
ther gender differences in observed characteristics or by the returns to these
observed skills. However, between 1981 and 1991 the closing of the gender
wage gap seems to have halted and the unexplained gender wage gap even
increased somewhat.
If we taker a closer look at the change in the unexplained gender wage
gap an interesting pattern emerges. The mean percentile ranking of women in
the residual distribution of male wages increased sharply from 1968 to 1981,
from the 27th to the 36th percentile, and decreased somewhat between 1981
and 1991. A woman’s percentile ranking indicates her level of unobserved
skills relative men and possible labor market discrimination of women, see
also discussion in the previous section. Table 3 also shows residual wage
inequality declined up to and including 1981 for both men and women. Be-
tween 1981 and 1991 this decline continued for women.19
Table 3 The gender wage gap 1968 to 1991. Employed men and women aged 18-65.
1968 1974 1981 1991
















Gender wage gap, Dt 0.321 0.266 0.187 0.195
Unexpl. gender wage
gap (-stDqt)
0.252 0.190 0.119 0.124
Mean female percentile
in male wage distr.*
distribution
26.9 29.6 35.7 34.4
Male res. wage ineq.** 0.319 0.263 0.248 0.245
Female res. wage
ineq.***
0.354 0.278 0.229 0.199
* Computed by assigning  each woman a percentile ranking in the indicated year’s
male residual distribution and calculating the female mean of these percentiles.
** Estimated using male wage regressions, see Table A2a.
*** Estimated using female wage regressions, see Table A2b.
Table 4 shows the decline in the gender wage gap decomposed into gender
specific and wage structure effects. The negative value in the last row indi-
cates, for example in the 1968-74 column, that the gender wage gap nar-
rowed by 5.47 log points.
12 The most important effect among the gender spe-
cific factors is the ”gap effect” which accounted for 39 per cent
(=0.0214/0.0547)  of the decline in the gender wage gap. Another important
factor is the change in relative industrial representation of male and female
workers. Between 1968 and 1974 the fraction of female employees in the
social and community sector increased and since this sector was relatively
well paid in 1968, this change in industrial representation was beneficial to
women. The gender wage gap is also somewhat reduced by the fact that
women increase their work experience relative to men, but this effect is
counteracted by a reduction on the relative level of education form women.
If we instead we turn to changes in the wage structure we see a large
detrimental effect of changed inter industry wage differentials on female rela-
                                                       
12 This means that women’s relative wage increased by approximately 5.47 per cent. The
exact change in women’s relative wage is found by calculating 1-e
0.05747)*100=5.62 per
cent, where e denotes the natural logarithm.20
tive wages. For example, employees in the social and community services
earned 9 per cent more than employees in the manufacturing industry in
1968, but 4 per cent less in 1974 (see Table A2a). This large detrimental
change in wage structure was compensated by a beneficial “unobserved
prices effect” which accounted for approximately 74 per cent of the closing
of the gender wage gap. The overall effect of changes in the wage structure
is therefore rather small.
Between 1974 and 1981 the gender specific factors accounted for ap-
proximately 96 per cent of the change in gender wage gap. In Table 4, we
see that women improve their relative level of work experience and, in par-
ticular, they improved their relative position in male residual wage distribu-
tion; the ”gap effect” is -6.23 log points. Another important factor is the
continued improvement of women’s relative amount of work experience. The
industry representation of women is of minor importance during this time
period. However, the gender difference in education increased slightly. Con-
cerning the wage structure effects, the results show that the effects of
changing returns to education and experience are small. The “unobserved
prices” effect is small too. Changed inter industry wage differentials, how-
ever, widened the gender wage gap by 1.39 log points, ceteris paribus.
Between 1981 and 1991 the change in the gender wage gap is small.
This is also true for the individual components. Women improved their rela-
tive level of education and work experience but this effect is (once again)
counterbalanced by changed industry wage differentials.
The results indicate that during the investigated period the closing of
the gender wage gap is mainly due to gender specific factors. In particular,
women have improved their relative level of unobserved skills and/or have
experienced a reduction in labor market discrimination. Men and women
have also converged in the average level of work experience.
13 Changes in
the wage structure did not contribute to the decline in the gender wage gap
                                                       
13  We also run estimations using predicted work experience, defined as age minus years of
education minus seven. Compared to the results in Table 4, men and women converged
less in predicted work experience. This result is of course expected because women have
increased their average level of actual level of work experience since 1968. Further, sub-
stituting actual for predicted work experience did only have minor effect on the estimates
of the gap and unobserved prices effects.21
to any larger extent. However, when we decompose the wage structure ef-
fects, we see a large detrimental effect on the gender wage gap of changes in
inter industry wage differentials throughout the period.
14 Between 1968 and
1974, the “unobserved prices effect” was also very large and completely off-
set the (to women) unfavorable inter industry wage structure effect.
During the investigated period women’s labor force participation in-
creased very sharply as shown in Figure 1. It is possible that the large inflow
of women consisted of relatively low skilled women, which may have slowed
down the closing of the gender wage gap and the skill convergence between
men and women. In this case our results may be affected by selectivity bias.
Palme and Wright (1992) correct for sample selection bias in an analysis of
the Swedish gender wage gap using in part the same data as we are. Their
results indicate that only a minor part of the gender wage gap is explained by
sample selection bias.
Here, we perform a very crude test of this possibility by, adding a
dummy variable to each cross section wage equation indicating whether the
woman was employed in two consecutive sample years. In 1968 and 1974
these women earned significantly more (approximately 8 per cent more) than
other women. However, in the 1974-81 and 1981-91 samples this was not
the case. We also computed the JMP-decomposition for women employed in
two consecutive sample years. This group of women closed the gender wage
gap more than other women mainly because they increased their relative level
of work experience more than women in general.








Changes in gender specific factors:
Education variables 0.0134 0.0087 -0.0040
Work experience variables -0.0128 -0.0216 -0.0135
                                                       
14 We also estimated the JMP-decomposition using human capital variables only but the
results did not change much, see Table A4 in appendix. However the composed effects of
the industry variables showed up as expected in the gap effect. In the 1968-74 and the
1981-91 sample the gap effect became positive, and in the 1974-81 sample less negative
than the estimate in Table 4.22
Industry variables -0.0201 -0.0006 0.0019
Unobserved skills and discrimination -0.0214 -0.0623 0.0024
Changes in wage structure:
Education variables -0.0040 -0.0086 0.0004
Work experience variables -0.0087 0.0013 0.0004
Industry variables 0.0397 0.0139 0.0165
Unobserved prices -0.0407 -0.0095 0.0031
Total change in gender specific factors -0.0409 -0.0758 -0.0134
Total change in wage structure -0.0138 -0.0030 0.0203
Total change in wage gap -0.0547 -0.0789 0.0069
The pattern changes quite dramatically if we instead focus on low paid
women. We define low paid women as those that have the 50 per cent lowest
predicted wages according to men’s wage equations.
15 We compare these
women to all men. The gender wage gap declined more for low-paid women
than for women on average between 1968-74 and 1974-81, by 12.50 log
points and 10.85 log points respectively, and increased somewhat between
1981 and 1991.
The wage structure effects were more important for low-paid women
than for women on average, especially between 1968 and 1974 when this
effect contributed by over 46 per cent to the decline in the gender wage gap.
Returns to education, work experience, and unobserved prices improved
women’s relative wages up to 1981. However, changes in inter industry
wage differentials worked against low paid women throughout the period.
However, this effect seems somewhat smaller than for women on average,
see Table 4. The perhaps most remarkable result in Table 5 is the large bene-
ficial gap effect between 1974 and 1981 which alone contributed to a decline
in the gender wage gap of 8.52 log points.
                                                       
15 This means that the characteristics of the low paid women vary between sample years,
because the returns to human capital and the rents received in different sectors partly de-
termine who is low paid and these coefficients change over time. In Table A5 in appendix
we report the average level of the human capital variables for low paid women in each
sample year. We also calculated the JMP-decomposition for the 50 per cent women with
the lowest actual wages, see results in Table A3.23
Between 1981 and 1991 the change in the gender wage gap for low
paid women is similar to the change in gender wage gap for women in gen-
eral. The wage gap widened somewhat and the individual components are
rather small. However, once again we observe that the industry wage struc-
ture changed unfavorably to women relative men.
Table 5 JMP-decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap. Less skilled women







Changes in gender specific factors:
Education variables 0.0030 0.0302 0.0033
Work experience variables 0.0033 -0.0418 -0.0110
Industry variables -0.0443 -0.0013 -0.0021
Unobserved skills and discrimination -0.0294 -0.0852 -0.0050
Changes in wage structure:
Education and work experience -0.0337 -0.0162 -0.0015
Work experience variables -0.0303 -0.0064 0.0024
Industry variables 0.0367 0.0196 0.0302
Unobserved prices -0.0303 -0.0075 0.0021
Total change in gender specific factors -0.0674 -0.0980 -0.0149
Total change in prices -0.0576 -0.0105 0.0334
Total change in wage gap -0.1250 -0.1085 0.0184
The analysis so far shows that women on average have improved their posi-
tion in the labor market. During the investigated time period several political
reforms were undertaken in order to increase women’s incentives for human
capital accumulation and labor force participation, see section 3 for further
discussion. To the extent that these reforms have had an effect, we suspect
young women to have been more responsive to these reforms. The reason is
that young women have made their decisions on human capital and labor
force attachment after some of the major reforms came into force. Informa-
tion on how the younger women fare in the labor market over time may also
help in predicting how women will perform in the future.24
In Table 6 we report an analysis of the gender wage gap between
young men and women, aged 18 to 34. Comparing Table 4 and 6 we see that
young women have indeed improved their relative position more than women
on average, in particular between 1974 and 1981. Three other interesting
patterns also emerge in Table 6. First of all, the gender wage gap between
young men and women declined over the entire investigated period, although
only by 0.65 log points between 1981 and 1991. Second, the results indicate
that gender specific factors are important driving forces behind this decline.
In particular, young men and women converged in unobserved skills
throughout the period. Young women also improved their relative level of
work experience up to 1981. Third, changes in inter industry wage differen-
tials had particularly strong unfavorable effects for young women between
1968 and 1974. This effect is much larger for young women and men than
for women and men in general.
16
                                                       
16 We also compared young women to all men and in this comparison young women im-
proved their relative wage even more up to and including 1981, and thereafter their rela-
tive wage deteriorated.25
Table 6  JMP-decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap. Young men







Changes in gender specific factors:
Education variables 0.0206 -0.0002 -0.0120
Work experience variables -0.0262 -0.0289 0.0145
Industry variables -0.0288 -0.0128 0.0107
Unobserved skills and discrimination -0.0393 -0.0503 -0.0390
Changes in wage structure:
Education variables -0.0101 -0.0041 -0.0034
Work experience variables -0.0190 -0.0054 0.0003
Industry variables 0.0754 0.0111 0.0234
Unobserved prices -0.0229 -0.0237 -0.0010
Total change in gender specific factors -0.0737 -0.0921 -0.0259
Total change in wage structure 0.0234 -0.0219 0.0194
Total change in wage gap -0.0503 -0.1140 -0.0065
5. Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to analyze the role of wage compression
for the rapid increase of women's relative wages during the 1960s and 1970s.
Such a relationship was important between 1968 and 1974 when the reduc-
tion of overall wage inequality was dramatic. In 1981, however, the wage
compression effect accounted only for a minor proportion of women's rela-
tive wage gains, as compared to 1974. Now, the gap effect, the average
woman moving up the male residual wage distribution was the totally domi-
nating effect. This effect may be due to either decreased gender discrimina-
tion in the labor market, or to women closing the gap in acquired unobserved
productive characteristics. The latter explanation would be parallel to the
increases in women's relative observed characteristics. Between 1981 and
1991 there is a small increase in the gender wage gap. This small increase
seems to have been driven by changed inter-industry wage differentials.26
If one was to interpret our results in terms of the effects of union
wage policy, a somewhat bold exercise, the following tentative conclusions
emerge. Solidarity wage policy may, through reducing residual wage ine-
quality, have played an important role in the decreasing gender wage gap in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the late 1970s, however, wage compres-
sion does not seem to be a major factor. However, throughout the period,
changes in the inter-industry wage structure have systematically worked in
the direction of increasing the gender wage gap. To the extent industry wage
differentials actually have been driven by union wage policy, this policy actu-
ally seems to have partly offset some of the gains made by women in other
dimensions of the wage structure. For low-wage women, though, the com-
pression of the wage structure has been a very important part of their in-
creasing relative wages up to the mid 1980’s.
A particularly interesting issue to study is the relative wages of young
women. These women have experienced increasing relative wages through-
out the period. In particular, they have improved their observed and unob-
served skills relative to young men. This may indicate that the political re-
forms, providing strong incentives for human capital accumulation and labor
force attachment, have had an effect. The continuing improvement of the
relative position of young women provides perhaps a hint of how the future
position of women in the Swedish labor market will develop.27
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Publlic Administration Quarterly, Vol. 18, 342-358.Table A1 Male mean values of explanatory variables. Note that education variables and industry
representation variables are dummy variables and the mean values indicate the proportion of the
sample in each category.
1968 1974 1981 1991
Human capital variables
Work exp. (years) 22.60 21.79 20.81 20.41
ED1 0.572 0.435 0.334 0.208
ED2 0.173 0.19 0.240 0.295
ED3 0.084 0.059 0.058 0.0898
ED4 0.077 0.14 0.120 0.115
ED5 0.022 0.048 0.051 0.066
ED6 0.031 0.054 0.096 0.117
ED7 0.039 0.070 0.102 0.108
Industry representation
Agriculture and hunting 0.036 0.016 0.020 0.010
Forestry and logging 0.022 0.027 0.018 0.014
Iron ore and non-ferrous ore mine 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.007
Food, beverages, and tobacco 0.038 0.028 0.026 0.028
Textile, wearing apparel and leather 0.024 0.018 0.009 0.004
Wood and wood products 0.035 0.031 0.027 0.030
Paper, paper products, and printing 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.047
Chemical 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.019
Stone, clay, and glass 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.0059
Basic metal 0.033 0.028 0.026 0.020
Fabricated metal prod., machinery and
equipment
0.206 0.203 0.179 0.176
Other manufacturing 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.003
Electricity and gas 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.011
Construction 0.140 0.14 0.107 0.129
Wholesale trade 0.042 0.034 0.033 0.038
Retail trade 0.038 0.032 0.045 0.042
Restaurants and hotels 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.013
Transport and storage 0.066 0.061 0.068 0.070
Communication 0.029 0.026 0.030 0.032
Financial institutions 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.022
Insurance 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.011
Real estate and business service 0.026 0.036 0.051 0.047
Public administration and defense 0.054 0.056 0.055 0.052
Sanitary services 0.025 0.010 0.013 0.011
Social and related community services 0.043 0.088 0.121 0.127
Recreational and cultural services 0.005 0.010 0.017 0.017
Personal and household services 0.005 0.025 0.015 0.01631
Table A1b Female mean values of explanatory variables. Note that education variables and in-
dustry representation variables are dummy variables and the mean values indicate the proportion
of the sample in each category.
1968 1974 1981 1991
Human capital variables
Work exp. (years) 14.86 14.65 15.55 17.10
ED1 0.552 0.422 0.341 0.204
ED2 0.120 0.133 0.187 0.280
ED3 0.124 0.126 0.101 0.114
ED4 0.148 0.199 0.196 0.144
ED5 0.010 0.031 0.034 0.068
ED6 0.032 0.058 0.092 0.122
ED7 0.015 0.031 0.049 0.068
Industry representation
Agriculture and hunting 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.003
Forestry and logging 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
Iron ore and non-ferrous ore mine 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
Food, beverages, and tobacco 0.041 0.021 0.019 0.014
Textile, wearing apparel and leather 0.041 0.033 0.0167 0.012
Wood and wood products 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.008
Paper, paper products, and printing 0.023 0.017 0.017 0.022
Chemical 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.008
Stone, clay, and glass 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.002
Basic metal 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Fabricated metal prod., machinery and
equipment
0.046 0.057 0.049 0.041
Other manufacturing 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.005
Electricity and gas 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
Construction 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.010
Wholesale trade 0.032 0.031 0.019 0.021
Retail trade 0.106 0.098 0.084 0.073
Restaurants and hotels 0.034 0.015 0.021 0.026
Transport and storage 0.018 0.015 0.019 0.029
Communication 0.035 0.029 0.030 0.025
Financial institutions 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.030
Insurance 0.013 0.015 0.020 0.022
Real estate and business service 0.036 0.031 0.024 0.043
Public administration and defense 0.056 0.063 0.047 0.048
Sanitary services 0.105 0.014 0.009 0.010
Social and related community services 0.253 0.431 0.520 0.515
Recreational and cultural services 0.004 0.015 0.014 0.015
Personal and household services 0.049 0.031 0.013 0.00732
Table A2a    Estimated wage equations for employed men 18-65 years old. Dependent variable is
the logarithm of hourly wage.


























































































































































Table A2a, continued from previous page
Dummy-variables for two-digit
industry















































































































































Number of observations 1 781 1 695 1 661 1 551
Standard deviation (s) 0.319 0.230 0.248 0.245
R
2 0.442 0.331 0.333 0.369
Note. Standard error in parenthesis. The variable experience measures years of work experience.
Self-employed are excluded. Educational dummies are: 1-(reference group) old compulsory
school, 2-old compulsory school + vocational school, 3-new compulsory school and old realex-
amen, 4-realexamen+vocational school, 6-three year high school (gymnasium), 6-high
school+vocational school, 7-university degree. Source: Swedish Level of Living survey.34
Table A2b   Estimated wage equations for employed women 18-65 years old. Dependent variable
is the logarithm of hourly wage.


























































































































































Table A2b, continued from previous page.
Dummy-variables for two-digit
industry















































































































































Number of observations 1 141 1 308 1 553 1 471
Standard deviation (s) 0.354 0.290 0.230 0.199
R
2 0.343 0.321 0.258 0.300
Notes: see Table A2a.36
Table A3 JMP-decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap. Low-paid women
compared to all men aged 18 to 65.
1968 - 1974 1974 - 1981 1981 - 1991
Changes in gender specific factors:
Education variables 0.0136 0.0169 -0.0040
Work experience variables -0.0216 -0.0220 -0.0103
Industry variables -0.0268 -0.0025 0.0054
Unobs. skills and discrimination 0.0163 -0.0999 -0.0174
Changes in wage structure:
Education variables -0.0301 -0.0174 -0.0011
Work experience variables -0.0161 -0.0027 0.0014
Industry variables 0.0319 0.0109 0.0195
Unobserved prices -0.0768 -0.0230 0.0047
Total change in gender specific factors -0.0186 -0.1074 -0.0263
Total change in wage structure -0.0912 -0.0321 0.0244
Total change in wage gap -0.1098 -0.1399 -0.0018
Table A4 JMP-decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap. Employed men and
women aged 18 to 65. Human capital variables only.
1968 - 1974 1974 - 1981 1981 - 1991
Changes in gender specific factors:
Education variables 0.0140 0.0087 -0.0040
Work experience variables -0.0133 -0.0221 -0.0141
Unobs. skills and discrimination 0.0098 -0.0521 0.0186
Changes in wage structure:
Education variables -0.0058 -0.0090 -0.0007
Work experience variables -0.0086 0.0024 0.0007
Unobserved prices -0.0508 -0.0068 0.0065
Total change in gender specific factors 0.0105 -0.0655 0.0005
Total change in wage structure -0.0652 -0.0133 0.0064
Total change in wage gap -0.0547 -0.0789 0.0006937
Table A5 Average level of work experience and education among low-paid women.
1968 1974 1981 1991
Work exp. 10.91 9.32 11.40 12.76
Ed1 0.7387 0.5382 0.5103 0.3391
Ed2 0.1098 0.1254 0.2397 0.3881
Ed3 0.1219 0.1453 0.0615 0.1018
Ed4 0.0296 0.1483 0.1346 0.0787
Ed5 0.0000 0.0321 0.0385 0.0651
Ed6 0.0000 0.0107 0.0141 0.0258
Ed7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0014